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This paper studies a plausible connection among rational speculators, exchange 
rate volatility and capital controls.    When Krugman (1999) asserted that there should 
be appropriate controls on international capital movements to avoid currency 
volatilities from speculative activities, this paper shows whether to take capital 
controls depends on types of shocks and the risk preference of rational speculators. 
(1)If only current account shocks occur, the increase in the risk preference of rational 
speculators will decrease the conditional variance of exchange rates. In this case, the 
best policy is to let capitals freely move in the world. (2)If only interest rate shocks 
occur, the conditional variance of the exchange rate is monotonically increasing in the 
risk preference of rational speculators.  Under such circumstance, the controls over 
international capital movements indeed decrease the exchange rate volatility. (3)When 
both current account and capital account shocks occur, then, if speculators are more 
risky, capital controls decrease exchange-rate volatility; however, if speculators are 







Key words: Capital controls, Speculation, Exchange Rate Volatility 
JEL codes: F32 
                                           
  This is a preliminary draft.    Comments are welcome.    Corresponding e-mail account is 
mercy@nccu.edu.tw.   2
 
1.  Introduction 
In 1990s, the capital flowed significantly into the developing countries as the 
international capital mobility increased.    However, during this period, financial crisis 
exploded one after another in these developing countries: the Latin America crisis in 
1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997.  These two financial crises happened so closely 
that it means similar crisis will be likely to happen again in the future.  The 
similarity in both financial crises was the speculative behavior playing a very 
important role.    As a result, the relationships among the international capital mobility, 
speculative behavior and the currency crisis become the important topic for every 
government and authority, and turn out also as key issues for academic researches 
[Das (1999)].   
The rapid movements of the international capital across countries have been 
regarded as the cause of unstable currency of the developing countries.  The 
contagion effect occurred in the financial crisis leads to devaluation in those countries 
that originally adopt fixed exchange rate; as a result, the exchange rate is forced to 
float.  On the other hand, those countries with floating exchange rates also face 
depreciation of their own currencies and large fluctuation in the exchange rates.  
Such fluctuation of exchange rates is one of the asset prices over-fluctuated 
phenomenon in the financial crisis [Crockeet (1997)].  Calvo and Mendoza (2000) 
attributed the volatility of exchange rates to the herd behaviors of people when they 
re-allocate their assets in obtaining the optimum international portfolios.  Such 
behavior is always treated as the speculative behavior, if it results to a dramatic 
fluctuation in the asset prices.    However, Lagunnoff and Schreft (1999) asserted that 
this is just a sensible reaction for investors when they attempt to maximize expected 
profits under uncertainties.     
What are the effects caused by the speculative behavior on the exchange rate 
volatility? There have been various views.  Friedman (1953) claimed that rational 
speculative activity must smooth exchange rates.  On the other hand, Carlson and 
Osler (2000) criticized Friedman’s point because it does not take the interest-rate 
differentials into account in his interpretation of speculative behavior.  As the 
difference between interest rates is what causes the speculative activity, speculation 
may increase the volatility of exchange rates.   Whether rational speculators stabilize 
the exchange rate will depend upon the level of speculation.    Rational speculation is 
stabilizing at low levels of speculative activity and destabilizing at high levels.  
Although the theoretical views are quite contradicting, the past experiences show the 
manipulation of hedge fund always leads to the great fluctuation in exchange rates   3
during the financial crisis. 
With an increase in international capital mobility and a decrease in the cost of 
transactions, the transactions of the foreign exchange have rapidly risen since the 
1990s.  Bartolini and Drazen (1997) showed that after loosening capital controls, 
large amount of foreign capital flowed into the developing countries.    The short-term 
fluctuation of exchange rates will increase as foreign exchange transactions rise and 
the financial instruments developed[Tobin(1984)].  If this argument is true, then the 
free movements of capital obviously provide an opportunity to take arbitrage in either 
interest rates or exchange rates, and then result in volatile exchange rates.    Krugman 
(1999) asserted that there should be appropriate controls on the international capital 
movements to avoid currency instability from speculative activities.  Ito and Portes 
(1998) and Eichengreen (1999) also had similar views. 
However, Edwards (1998) did not agree with capital control.  By the empirical 
evidence from Latin American countries, he argued that there is no necessary 
relationship between the international capital mobility and the financial instability; 
therefore, we do not have to doubt those policies that help to liberalize the movement 
of capital across countries.  In addition, Edwards (1999) further asserted that the 
short-run controls of capital movement might decrease the financial instability in the 
short run, but a country should not restrict the international capital movement in the 
long run.  Instead, it should work hard to achieve a sound and integrated economic 
system and adopt proper policies. 
From the literature that analyze the currency volatility, no matter it analyzes the 
changes in exchange rates through the behavior of speculators or from the view of 
controlling the movement of capital to achieve the stability of the currency, there has 
been no consensus.  Furthermore, except Carlson and Osler (2000), the papers that 
investigate the relationship between the speculative behavior and the volatility of 
exchange rates do not explicitly study this issue theoretically.    However, Carlson and 
Osler (2000) didn’t consider the consistency conditions required for 
profit-maximizing speculators, and whether restricting capital flows can stabilize 
exchange rates.  Therefore, this paper is attempting to clarify the relationship 
between rational speculation, capital mobility and exchange rate  volatility.  There  are 
two main aims of this paper: one is to build a stochastic foreign exchange model with 
rational speculators to analyze whether speculative behaviors cause the exchange rates 
volatility under the consideration of consistent conditions required for speculators.  
The second propose is to introduce capital controls to evaluate whether such policies 
reduce or increase the exchange rate volatility with the inclusion of rational 
speculators.   4
 
 
2.  The  Model 
The stochastic foreign exchange model with rational speculators in this paper has 
the following characteristics: 
  (1) Under the assumption that rational speculators attempt to maximize the expected 
utility, and the utility is a function of speculative profits, we derive speculators’ 
demand for foreign exchanges.  The first-order condition for optimum 
speculative behavior will be explicitly considered in this paper when we 
investigate the effects of both rational speculative activities and capital controls on 
exchange rate volatilities. 
 (2) There are two types of demands for foreign exchanges in each period of time: 
one is the need for actual transactions from international trades.  This type of 
demand for foreign exchanges is assumed to be a linear function of exchange 
rates.  The  other  is  speculator’s demand from profit arbitrages. 
  (3) There are also two types of supplies for foreign exchanges in each period of time: 
one is the supply from international trades.    This type of supply is also assumed 
to be a linear function of exchange rates.  The other comes from the sales of 
speculators who bought in last period of time.     
 (4) In this paper, we assume that people’s expectations are rational.  Therefore, the 
expectation is based on all information available in current period.    In addition, 
the expected exchange rates have to satisfy the consistent condition required by 
rational expectation hypothesis [Lucas (1976)].  Since the expected variable 
appears in the asset demand function, such kind of asset demand for foreign 
exchanges by speculators would be rational. 
First, we derive the speculators’ demand for foreign exchange.  Assuming that 
t B  is the amount of foreign exchange bought by speculators in  t period, and  t π  
represents the expected profits for speculators, then   
) ( 1 t t t t t t e e E B δ π + − = + . (1) 
The t e ,  1 + t t e E  in the above equation are the exchange rate in t  period and the   5
expected exchange rate for  1 + t  period in t  period respectively.  Suppose that 
t t t i i − =
* δ  denotes the excess of own-currency returns on foreign securities,
*
t i  over 
own-currency returns on domestic securities,  t i .  It will be assumed that the only 
domestic and foreign securities available are one-period bonds.    Thus the returns 
*
t i  
and  t i  are interest rates known with certainty at time t , and  t δ  represents the 
interest differential. 
Suppose that these speculators maximize the expected value of a one-period 
utility function  U   defined over the level of speculative profits.    The utility value of 
speculators is therefore given by 
) ( t t U U π = . (2) 
In the steady state equilibrium, the expected profit is zero.  Expanding the above 
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We can obtain speculators’ demand for foreign exchanges from the above first-order 
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− = , therefore   
) ( 1 t t t t t e e E B δ α + − = + . (7) 
As a result, the speculative demand for foreign exchanges is related to the 
speculators’ attitude toward the risk aversion and the one-period-ahead forecast 
variance of the exchange rates.     
If the demand for and the supply of foreign exchanges from current account 
traders in  t period are  t D  and  t S , and both are assumed to be linear functions of 
the current exchange rate respectively as follows: 
t t t v e D + − = β ,  (8) 
t t t u e S + = γ ,  (9) 
where  t v and  t u  represent unexpected shocks from the demand and supply of 
foreign exchanges, respectively.  Both are called as current account shocks later in 
this paper and assumed to be serially uncorrelated with  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = = = t t t t u v E u E v E , 
2 2) ( u t u E σ = , and 
2 2) ( v t v E σ = . 
 
 
3.  Market Solution 
Combining the purchases and sales of speculators to the foreign exchange 
supplies and demands of current account traders, we derive the period t market 
clearing condition:   7
t t t t S B D B + = + −1 ; (10) 
that is, 
0 ) ( ) ( 1 = − + − − t t t t S D B B .  Then,  we  obtain 
t 1 1 1 - ) (
1
) ( ∆ − +
+




where the exogenous change in the interest rate differential, 1 − − t t δ δ , has been 
denoted as  t ∆   and is called as capital account shock in this paper.    This equilibrium 
condition is valid for any arbitrarily selected period of time.  Looking  j  periods 
into the future, we therefore obtain   
j t 1 1 1 - ) (
1
) ( + + + + − + + − + + + + + ∆ − +
+




Using all information set of period  1 − t , taking the expected value of the above 
expression, and recalling that  t t t j t t e E e E E
1 1 − + − = , and  0
1 1 1 = ∆ = = + − + − + − j t t j t t j t t E E u E ν , for all 
0 ≥ j , we obtain 
j t t j t t j t t j t t j t t e E e E e E e E e E + − − + − + − + − + + −
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Use of the lag operator allows  j t t j t t e E L e E + −
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therefore obtain 








To solve the solution of equation (15), either we require that  0
1 = + − j t t e E  for  all  j  or 
we require that quadratic form in L  be identically equal to zero. Therefore, a 
nontrivial solution requires that 
0 1 ) (2
2 = +
+




Assuming that  1 λ  and  2 λ   are the roots of the above quadratic function, then we can 
obtain   8





+ = + 2 2 1 . (17) 
Therefore, the general solution to a homogenous difference equation of this type is 
given by 
j j
j t t d c e E 2 1 1 λ λ + = + − , (18) 
where  c and d  are determined by an initial-value condition.  Since 1 1 1 − − − = t t t e e E , 
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Since  1 2 1 = λ λ , and  2 2 1 > +λ λ , it must be true that each root is positive; 
moreover, one root is greater than 1, and the other root is less than 1.  The equation 
in  j t t e E + −1  can be nonexplosive only if the constant corresponding to the root that is 
greater than 1 is equal to zero.  Assume that  2 1 λ λ λ < ≡ , where  1 λ  is arbitrarily 
selected as the smaller of the two roots.  In this case, we require that  0 ≡ d , and 
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So, the expected exchange rates for period  t and  period  1 + t  are 
1 1 − − = t t t e e E λ , (23) 
t t t e e E λ = +1 . (24)   9
Substituting the solved expected values of exchange rates into equation (11) to obtain 
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1
) ( ) (1 ) (1 ∆ − +
+
= − + − − − t t t t t v u e e λ e λ
α α
γ β
.    (25) 
Collecting terms, we therefore find that 
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Calculate the expected value of the above equation to obtain 
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Rationality therefore requires that 











The above equation can be rewritten as   
λ λ ) ( ) (1
2 γ β α + = − . (29) 
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From the reduced-form expression in equation (26), the one-period-ahead forecast for 
1 + t e   conditional on all information available at  t  is given by 
2
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Substituting equation (31) into equation (30) to obtain 
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which can be rearranged as: 
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λ . (33) 
Using the required consistent conditions for rational expectation in equation (29) and 
the speculative behavior in equation (33), we obtain   10
) (
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4.    Rational Speculation and Exchange Rate Volatility 
Lucas (1976 ) argued that the rules by which agents form their expectations vary 
as the structure of economy changes.  Therefore, it was incorrect in the model of 
Muth (1961) to treat λ  as a fixed parameter in performing comparative statics 
analysis involving expectational variables.  From the result shown as in equation 
(34),  λ   and other parameters in the model have a specific relationship. 
The following analyzes the effects caused by the change in the risk preference of 
rational speculators on the conditional variances of exchange rates.  Differentiate 
2
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Application of equation (29) and equation (33) allows derivation of 
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From the above expressions, we can infer a number of important aspects of the 
relationship between speculative activity and exchange rate volatility: 
(1) If only current account shocks occur, with  0
2 = ∆ σ , then 
0
) (












d t . (37) 
Thus, the smaller θ , the more risky of speculators, the greater speculative 
activity, the smaller the conditional variance of the exchange rate is. 
(2) If only interest rate shock occurs, with  0
2 2 = = v u σ σ , then   11
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d t  (38) 
The outcome obtained in this case is contrasting with that derived in the first case.   
As speculative activity rises, the conditional variance of the exchange rate 
increases. 






1 ,  is ambiguous.  Through 
numerical simulation, we can see that as  θ   decreases, the conditional variance of 
the exchange rate first falls, and then rises from Table 1. 
 
 
5. The Role of Rational Speculators 
To understand why rational speculators either temper or strengthen the exchange 
rate’s response to transitory shocks, let’s examine the case of a transitory current 
account shock first. 
The equation (26) can be rearranged as   
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λ λ . (39) 
Suppose that  0 > t u  at period t with  0 = ∆ = t t v .  Assuming as well that the 
value of  1 − t e  initially  equals  to e , then in this case, equation (39) becomes 
t t u e e
) 1 ( λ α
λ
−
− = . (40) 
When the speculators observe that  t e  is below e  with  0 > t u , they would expect 
the exchange rate to rise back to  e   in the next period.    This implies a profit-making 
opportunity, and speculators would buy foreign currency to take this advantage.  
Those buys would put upward pressure on the exchange rate, as a result of which the 
exchange rate would initially decrease by less than the degree without speculators.  
The same logic can be applied to the case of  0 > t v  to find the stabilizing influence 
of rational speculators. 
Now consider how the market reacts to a capital account shock.  Assume that, 
up through period  1 − t , the exchange rate was at its long-run equilibrium and the   12
interest differential was zero.  Assuming as well that these are no current account 
shocks at period  t, but  0 > ∆t , then the exchange rate’s dynamics can be written as 
t t e e ∆
−
+ =
) 1 ( λ
λ
 (41) 
Thus, for interest rate shocks, speculators would sell foreign exchange rates when 
they expect the exchange rate to decline to e  in the next period.  According to 
equation (7), their adjustments in desired foreign currency holdings from an expected 
future fall in the value of foreign currency will be  t t t t e e E ∆ − = − + αλ α ) ( 1 . 
However, a positive shock  0 > ∆t  also causes speculators to increase their 
holdings of foreign assets due to the rise in foreign relative to domestic interest rates 
at period t.  The adjustments in this desired holdings are  t ∆ α .  Then, the net 
change in the foreign currency position turns out to be  t ∆ − ) 1 ( λ α .  Thus,  the  overall 
response is to buy foreign exchange to drive the exchange rate far away from  e  at 
period  t.    In this case, the speculative activity is destabilizing. 
 
 
6.    The Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Volatility 
As we deregulate the international capital controls in recent years, the increase in 
the capital mobility has been viewed as the cause of the fluctuation in exchange rates.   
Therefore, many contentions about controlling the speculative capital flows rise as 
well.  This section introduces a capital control coefficient into the speculative 
foreign exchange demand function to study the relationship between capital controls 
and the fluctuation of exchange rates.     
Assuming the foreign exchange demand function of speculators with capital 
controls is 
) ( 1 t t t t t e e E A B δ α + − = + . (42) 
In the above equation,  A  is the coefficient representing the degree of capital 
controls.  If  1 = A , this means there is no capital control and the international capital 
can move freely; if  0 = A , this means there is a completed capital control: the 
movement of international capital is not allowed.  Generally speaking, the capital 
controls of many countries among the actual economies fall between these two 
extreme cases.  If  A is between 0 and 1, this represents how capital movement is   13
controlled.    The higher the value of  A  is, the fewer the capital controls are.     
If we introduce the above speculative foreign exchange demand into the 
equilibrium equation in the foreign exchange market, and resolve the expected 
exchange rates, and then the exchange rates and the conditional variance of exchange 
rates, the results are as follows: 
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The consistent conditions for both rational expectation and speculative behavior 
require 












)] (1 ) [(












The following analyzes the effects caused by the change in the degree of capital 
controls on the conditional variance of exchange rates.  Differentiating 
2
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Differentiating both equation (45) and equation (46) with respect to  A, then we can 
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 is ambiguous.  However, we 
can infer a number of important aspects as followsj 
(1) If only current account shock occurs, with  0
2 = ∆ σ , then 
0









v u t σ σ λ σ
. (50) 
Thus, the conditional variance of the exchange rate is monotonically decreasing 
in the degree of capital control.  Increasing international capital mobility would 
decrease the volatility of the exchange rate.    Thus, the best policy in this case is 
to let international capital move freely. 
(2) If only capital account shock occurs, with  0
2 2 = = v u σ σ , then 
0
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d t  (51) 
The outcome obtained in this case is contrasting with that derived in the first case.   
Increasing capital mobility would increase the volatility of the exchange rate. 
Thus, the controls over capital movements should be taken in this case. 
(3) If all types of shocks occur, the sigh is ambiguous. With numerical simulation, 





  is negative first and then turns out 
to be positive.  The resulting simulation outcomes are shown from Table 2 to 
Table 5.    Whether we should take capital controls depends on the risk preference 
of rational speculators.  If speculators are less risky, then the exchange-rate 
volatility would decrease with free capital flows internationally; however, if 
speculators are more risky, then capital controls would decrease exchange rate 
volatility.   15
7.  Conclusion 
This paper sets up a stochastic foreign exchange model with rational speculators.   
It first analyzes the influence of the rational speculative activity on the exchange rate 
volatility, and then introduces capital controls into the model to investigate the effects 
of such controls on the exchange rate volatility.    The main points of this paper are as 
follows: 
(1) If only current account shocks occur, with  0
2 = ∆ σ , the increase in the risk 
preference of rational speculators will decrease the conditional variance of 
exchange rates.  As a result, rational speculators help stabilize the foreign 
exchange market.  This view differs from the argument that the speculative 
activity leads to fluctuations in the asset prices.  In this case, the best policy is 
to let capitals freely move in the world. 
(2) If only interest rate shock occurs, with  0
2 2 = = v u σ σ , the conditional variance of 
the exchange rate is monotonically increasing in the risk preference of rational 
speculators.  As speculative activity rises, the conditional variance becomes 
large.  This view is consistent with what speculators cause volatility in the 
assets market.    Under such circumstance, the controls over international capital 
movements indeed decrease the exchange rate volatility   
(3) If both types of shocks occur, then as the risk preference increases, the 
conditional variance first falls, and then increases.  Thus, whether we control 
capital movements also depends on the risk preference of rational speculators. 
In order to simplify the analysis, both domestic and foreign interest rates are 
treated as exogenous policy variables in this paper.  In the future, further 
investigation can be taken to consider the interest differentials as endogenously 
determined.   16
 
Table 1 






1 ,  without  capital  control. 
θ   λ  





= = = ∆
γ β
σ σ σ θ
σ
v u d
d t  
4.962184 0.1  0.065803 
2.383613 0.2  0.178077 
1.403601 0.3  0.141577 
1.049883 0.3522  0.000004 
1.049261 0.3523  -0.000371 
0.772901 0.4  -0.242598 
0.333333 0.5  -1.800000 
0.103761 0.6  -12.390208 
0.022859 0.7  -129.572098 
0.003109 0.8  -2710.151375 
0.000137 0.9  -302895.698328 
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Table 2 





 with  945 . 0 = θ . 
A  λ  
945 . 0












d t  
0.1 0.052819  -1.928073 
0.2 0.104920  -1.689269 
0.3 0.155072  -1.393412 
0.4 0.201565  -1.058587 
0.5 0.242785  -0.730412 
0.6 0.277956  -0.453904 
0.7 0.307326  -0.246241 
0.8 0.331743  -0.100157 
0.9 0.352181  -0.000088 
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Table 3 





 with  944 . 0 = θ . 
A  λ  
944 . 0












d t  
0.1 0.052874  -1.929893 
0.2 0.105029  -1.690492 
0.3 0.155226  -1.393865 
0.4 0.201752  -1.058265 
0.5 0.242988  -0.729551 
0.6 0.278160  -0.452846 
0.7 0.307524  -0.245209 
0.8 0.331931  -0.099246 
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Table 4 





 with  105 . 0 = θ . 
A  λ  
105 . 0












d t  
0.1 0.352181 -0.000793 
0.2 0.450560  1.926899 
0.3 0.495081  1.922263 
0.4 0.523005  1.794486 
0.5 0.543098  1.671133 
0.6 0.558679  1.565375 
0.7 0.574134  1.507340 
0.8 0.581975  1.399678 
0.9 0.591113  1.334016 
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Table 5 





 with  104 . 0 = θ . 
A  λ  
104 . 0












d t  
0.1 0.353792  0.062708 
0.2 0.451968  1.955232 
0.3 0.496052  1.937458 
0.4 0.523892  1.806671 
0.5 0.543933  1.681649 
0.6 0.559478  1.574795 
0.7 0.572115  1.484522 
0.8 0.582725  1.407683 
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